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This paper examines the solvency of the Greek fiscal policy. Employing a cointegrated 
VAR as a benchmark, evidence of a long-run link between revenues and spending is 
presented, although intertemporal solvency is violated. Utilizing Granger-causality tests, a 
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evidence indicates that fiscal adjustment should take place through spending rather than 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The issue of curtailing budget deficits is one of the central themes of economic 
policy for many member countries of the European Union (EU). Two of the key 
requirements for European Monetary Union (EMU) membership are that budget deficit 
is a maximum of 3% of national income, and that the amount of government borrowing 
should not exceed 60% of national income, measured as real GDP. Hence correcting for 
fiscal imbalances is a necessary condition for EMU membership. 
The issue of fiscal solvency of the government’s financial policy - that is whether it 
satisfies its intertemporal budget constraint - and the effects that budget deficits have 
motivated several empirical and theoretical studies. Most of these studies have been 
carried out for the U.S. economy, delivering mixed results. 
 
* This paper was written while I was a Ph.D. student at the European University Institute, in Florence, 
Italy. For useful discussions I would like to thank Søren Johansen, Katarina Juselius, Fragiskos Archontakis, 
Athanasios Tagkalakis and for detailed comments I would like to thank an anonymous referee of this journal.   
Of course the usual disclaimer applies. I would also like to thank the Lilian Voudouris Foundation for 
Financial support while writing this paper. PANAGIOTIS T. KONSTANTINOU  82
This study assesses if Greek fiscal policy is solvent, by employing cointegration 
analysis. More specifically, I find evidence of cointegration between government 
spending and revenues, but I find that the Greek budget has not historically satisfied the 
intertemporal solvency condition. To this end, I try address the issue of how to achieve 
intertemporal government budget balance, i.e., through revenue increases or spending 
reductions.
1  
More specifically, given the evidence of cointegration, a vector equilibrium 
correction model (VEqCM) was formulated in order to explore the direction of causality. 
This is of interest from an economic point of view for two reasons. First, it allows one to 
acquire empirical knowledge about the long-run performance of the government. Second, 
based on the estimation results, it allows one to evaluate whether control over one 
variable, spending or taxation, can lead to control over the other variable or not. The 
approach taken here is the Johansen procedure, which is an appropriate framework for 
the analysis of causality, allowing for simultaneous investigation of both cointegration 
and Granger causality.
2  
Finally, in this econometric framework, I am able to address the question of relative 
efficiency of adjustments through taxes or expenditures. Essentially, I focus on the long-
run effect of both means of adjustment and consider the issue of their ‘neutrality’ on 
long-run budget size and balance. The evidence presented show that the goal of 
balancing the budget could be achieved by reducing spending rather than increasing 
revenues.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the conditions of 
intertemporal government solvency in the long run and discusses the main theoretical 
hypotheses between the variables of interest. Section 3 gives a brief review of the 
literature, while Section 4 contains a description of the data used in the analysis and the 
econometric framework employed. The empirical results are presented in Section 5. The 
final section contains some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2.    THE GOVERNMENT INTERTEMPORAL BUDGET CONSTRAINT 
 
In every period the government must meet a budget constraint. Assuming that all 




1 Bohn (1991) used an equilibrium correction model (EqCM) for the U.S. to describe how intertemporal 
budget imbalances were corrected in the past. Although this study uses similar methodology, the questions 
addressed are somewhat different. Specifically I evaluate whether adjusting either expenditures or revenues is 
‘neutral’ for achieving equilibrium. 
2 The advantage of such an approach is that each variable is considered as potentially endogenous, being 
related to its own past values and the past values of other variables in the system. BALANCING THE BUDGET    83
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where  t γ  is the nominal GDP growth rate. Now letting lower case letters denote 
variable relative to GDP and let the net interest rate be  ( ) ( ) t t t i i γ + + + 1 / 1 ≡ ~ 1 , (1a) can 
be written as:   
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Solving (1b) forward yields the government’s intertemporal budget constraint:   
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. If the limit term in (2) equals zero then the current stock 
of outstanding debt,   is just equal to the discounted value of future government 
surpluses. This condition is often called the ‘No Ponzi Game’ condition and implies that 
the government cannot retain its debt simply by issuing new debt perpetually.   
If it is assumed that the net interest rate is stationary
5 with mean of  i ~ , then (1b) 
can be rewritten as, 
 
 
3 The interpretation of the interest rate in Equation (1) depends upon how the other variables are measured. 
See Hakkio and Rush (1991) fn. 2. 
4 See also Kremers (1989) for a discussion. 
5 Here I implicitly assume that the Fisher parity holds. In this case the net interest rate can be written as 
, where   is the inflation rate and   is the growth rate of real GDP. Of course, as an 
anonymous referee of this journal pointed it out, the net interest rate can be non-stationary, but only if the 
Fisher parity condition fails. Similarly, if 
() t t t y p i ∆ − ∆ − t p ∆ t y ∆
( ) t t p i ∆ −  is stationary, with   being also stationary, then the 
net interest rate    will also be stationary, as I have assumed. 
t y ∆
t i
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which must hold every period. Define  ( ) t t t t b i i g e ~ ~− + = , i.e., government spending 











+ + − =
i l t
l
l i t i t
i




i ~ 1+ = ρ . Using Equation (1b) and taking first differences of (3), Equation (4) 
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where   denotes government expenditure, r  government revenue and 
  the budget surplus, all relative to GDP. Now if   and   are  integrated 
of order one   so that their first differences are stationary, the right hand side of 
(5) is stationary. Imposing further the restriction that the growth rate of debt,  , is 
stationary implies that the limit term in (5) goes to zero.
t t t t b i g ge ~ ≡ +
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6  Thus the restriction implied by 
the government’s intertemporal budget constraint is that   must be stationary or 
that these two series are cointegrated with cointegrating vector of  , 1 [ − .
7 Furthermore, 
existence of a cointegrating relationship itself implies that   and    share a common 
stochastic trend (Stock and Watson (1988)).   
t ge t r
One observation should be made at this point. Notice, that if the source of 
nonstationarity is due to deterministic trends, say in the relative-to-output revenue and 
expenditure measures, the deterministic trend in the revenue-to-GDP ratio must be the 
same as that in the expenditure-to-GDP ratio (inclusive of interest payments) or the 
deficit will grow unboundedly as a proportion of GDP. Equation (5) then also implies a 
common deterministic trend. 
 
) )
6  This is actually a stronger restriction than that which is necessary for the limit term to vanish as 
demonstrated by Quintos (1995). But relaxing this restriction implies eventual government default on its 
outstanding stock of debt. Given this outcome, if the growth rate of debt is not stationary, the government 
might be unable to market its debt. Since the growth rate of real output is stationary, if 
 is nonstationary the debt-to-output ratio is growing. Furthermore, since taxes 
are, presumably, bounded as a percentage of real output, a growing debt-to-output ratio implies eventual 
default by the government. 
() ( ( t t t t t P GDP P B b / / / ∆ = ∆
7 Hakkio and Rush (1991) and Quintos (1995) demonstrate that the cointegration vector   where 
 is consistent with deficit sustainability since the limit term in (5) would still go to zero, but this 
would imply eventual government default on its debt, assuming no change in fiscal policy. 
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Another important issue to investigate is the existence and the direction of Granger-
causality between the two variables of interest. In general, there are four hypotheses 
regarding the direction of causality between government spending and revenues that 
have been used in the literature: (a) spending precedes revenue; (b) revenue precedes 
spending; (c) revenue and spending are jointly determined; and (d) revenue and 
spending are independent of each other. There are several theoretical motivations behind 
each hypothesis. 
 
1. Spend and Tax. Peacock and Wiseman (1979) and Barro (1979) argue that 
spending precedes revenue. More specifically, the tax smoothing hypothesis of Barro 
(1979) takes the path of government spending as given and taxes are adjusted to 
minimize distortions, while the budget is balanced intertemporally. 
 
2. Tax and Spend. Friedman (1978) argues that a government adjusts spending to the 
level of revenue, and therefore higher taxes would increase public expenditures. In this 
case, imposing higher taxes to restrict the size of the government deficit would instead 
raise it.   
 
3. Spending Changes Simultaneously with Revenue. This hypothesis is based on the 
equivalence of marginal cost and marginal revenue of the utility-maximizing suppliers 
and demanders of the public services. In this case the two aggregates mutually reinforce 
each other. 
 
4. Spending and Revenue Change Independently of each other. According to Hoover 
and Sheffrin (1992), the level of spending and revenue can be set by a rule of thumb, 
reflecting the view of institutional separation of allocation and taxation functions of the 
government. 
 
Which of these hypotheses is supported for Greece is an empirical question. 
Additionally, the issue of how it is more efficient to achieve intertemporal budget 
balance is important since it crucially hinges on which of the above assumptions hold. 




3.  PREVIOUS  STUDIES 
 
There are many studies that have been performed on the government’s intertemporal 
budget and the causal relationship between revenue and government spending. In a 
seminal article, Hamilton and Flavin (1986) demonstrate that the federal government 
cannot run a permanent deficit exclusive of interest payments on the debt, but may have 
a constant deficit when interest payments are included. The key result is that the real rate PANAGIOTIS T. KONSTANTINOU  86
of interest at which the government borrows must be greater than the growth rate of real 
debt so that the discounted present value of future government debt goes to zero. 
Furthermore, they claim that if the government budget is to be balanced in present value 
terms, the surplus (deficit) inclusive of interest payments should be stationary. Hamilton 
and Flavin present evidence that this condition is satisfied using annual data from 1960 
to 1984. But Kremers (1988) demonstrates that this result is not robust to lag 
specification in the test. Trehan and Walsh (1988) generalize the Hamilton and Flavin 
result to show that government expenditures, inclusive of interest payments, and 
revenues should be cointegrated with a cointegration vector equal to [ . They 
present evidence that supports this restriction. Hakkio and Rush (1991) point out that the 
restriction that the cointegrating vector between government expenditures, inclusive of 
interest payments, and revenues equal [
' ] 1 , 1−
, ] , 1 ′ − ge β  such that   is a sufficient 
condition for intertemporal budget balance but not, strictly speaking, a necessary 
condition. Quintos (1995) expands on Hakkio and Rush (1991) by stating the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for deficit sustainability as  . Haug (1995) presents 
similar results, using a slightly different methodology. 
, 1 = ge β
1 0 ≤ < ge β
On the other hand, Owoye (1995) examines the causal relationship between taxes 
and spending in the G7 countries by applying equilibrium-correction models. According 
to this study, bi-directional causality exists between taxes and spending in five G7 
countries, but unidirectional causality from revenues to spending exists only in the case 
of Italy and Japan. Ram (1988) finds that taxes Granger-cause spending at the federal 
level for the U.S., but spending Granger-causes taxes at the state and local level. Koren 
and Stiansy (1998) provide mixed results in a panel of nine industrialized countries. 
They find that in that causality runs in either direction depending on the country under 
study. Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou (1996) examine the Greek public finances; using a 
VEqCM, they find that taxes Granger-cause government spending, therefore that the 
observed behavior of the Greek government is consistent with the tax and spend 
hypothesis. Finally, in a related study, Kollias and Makrydakis (2000), find that there is 
bi-directional causality between revenues and taxes for Greece and Ireland, whereas the 
tax and spend hypothesis is supported for Spain and no direction of causality is 
established for Portugal. 
 
 
4.    DATA AND ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1  Data 
 
The data used in this study are quarterly from 1970:1 to 1997:1. Unfortunately, to 
the best of my knowledge, a longer time span of data on the Greek government budget is 
not available. The government expenditures inclusive of interest payments and 
government revenues were sampled from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) BALANCING THE BUDGET    87
Database. The nominal GDP series were obtained from the OECD Business Sector Data 
Base (BSDB). Government revenues and expenditures were seasonally adjusted using 
the Census X-11 (multiplicative) method.   
I use nominal variables relative to nominal GDP, since it is difficult to identify the 
appropriate deflator for expenditures and revenues, and the use of an inappropriate 
deflator could contaminate my results. Additionally, the employed theoretical 
framework can easily accommodate variables relative to GDP without any additional 
requirements, as was explained above. 
 
4.2  Econometric  Methodology 
 
In order to test the hypotheses discussed in Section 2, Johansen’s Full Information 
Maximum Likelihood (FIML) will be employed (Johansen (1995)). Johansen’s 
procedure starts with the definition of an n-dimensional vector of variables  . The 
Vector Autoregressive (VAR) representation of the unrestricted system with   lags 
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The hypothesis that   is    is formulated as the reduced rank hypothesis of the 
matrix   (see Johansen (1995)). Here one assumes that the matrix   has rank 
t x ) 1 ( I
Π Π
n r < . In this case    can be decomposed as the product of two matrices   where  Π β′ α
β α,  are  each  r n×   and have full rank  n r <  
 
β α ′ = Π ,                                                           ( 8 )  
 
Furthermore, the full rank of   is required, where  , ⊥ ⊥ β α Γ ′ ⊥ ⊥ β α   and    are   
matrices orthogonal to 
() r n n − ×
β α   and    respectively. Following this parameterization, there 
are  r  linearly independent stationary relations given by the cointegrating vectors  β ; 
the matrix  α   gives the speed of adjustment of the endogenous variables to their steady PANAGIOTIS T. KONSTANTINOU  88
state values (the cointegrating relations), while there are also  r n  linearly 
independent non-stationary relations. These last relations define the common 
stochastic trends of the system. Under these restrictions, the solution of   as a 
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where  ( ) ( ) L C ⊥
1
⊥ ⊥ ⊥ , α β α β ′ Γ ′
−
  is a polynomial in the lag operator, and   is  a 
function of initial conditions, such that  .  0 = Φ ′ β
Regressing   on   gives the residuals   and   
from which the residual product-moment-matrices   are 
constructed. Then 
1   and   − ∆ t t x x 1 1,..., , + − − ∆ ∆ k t t x x µ t R1
∑ 1 jt ′ =
= R R S
T
t it ij
β  is estimated as the eigenvectors associated with the r largest 
eigenvalues    found as the solution to the eigenvalue problem:  0 1 ... 1 > > > > r λ λ
0 = 01 . Johansen has developed a sequence of Likelihood Ratio (LR) tests for 
the hypothesis on the number of the cointegrating vectors (or equivalently the rank of  ); 
the so-called maximum eigenvalue test based on the statistic 
Π
( ) 1 + r r Q () 1 + r λ  
and the trace test based on the statistic:  ( ) ) i λ ∑ + =
n
r i 1ln − = T n r Q . Doornik (1998) has 
proposed a way for calculating the asymptotic p-values for the above tests, while 
asymptotic critical values are given in Johansen (1995) inter alia.  
10 11 − S S λ
 
4.3  Testing  the  Neutrality  of Fiscal Adjustments   
 
In a recent paper Garcia and Henin (1999) have proposed a way to evaluate the 
neutrality of adjusting fiscal imbalances by revenue or spending adjustments. The 
evaluation utilizes the VEqCM representation of the system  ( ) t t u x L + = ∆ . 
The Wold representation of the system is given by: 
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where   was given above in (9). Taking into account the fact that the matrix   
has reduced rank, assuming that 
C () 1 C
]   , 1 [ ge β β − = ′  and using the closed form solution in 
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The long-run response of the government surplus    to a revenue innovation is    t t t ge r s − ≡
 
() ( )( ) ( ) ge ge r ge r r r s K C C C α β 1 1 1 1 , , , − = − = ,                                 ( 1 2 )  
 
and the response to an expenditure innovation is   
 
() () () ( ) r ge ge ge ge r ge s K C C C α β − = − = 1 1 1 1 , , , ,                               ( 1 3 )  
 
Then for the choice of a fiscal adjustment strategy to be neutral, the sum of both 
responses must be zero: a 1% increase in revenues should have the same long-run effect 
on the surplus as expenditure cuts of the same amount: 
 
() ( ) ( )( ) 0 1 1 1 , , = − − = + r ge ge ge s r s K C C α α β ,                               ( 1 4 )  
 
From Equation (14) it is clear that neutrality prevails if either (i)  , 
since in this case no shock has persistent effects on the budget surplus, or if (ii) 
. Although both conditions are sufficient for neutrality they are associated with 
different mechanisms. In the first case, the stationarity of the budget balance implies its 
long-run invariance with respect to any perturbation. In the second case, the equilibrium 
correction term   impacts the same way on revenues and expenditures, with no 
resulting effect on the surplus. 
[] 1 , 1   or    1 − = ′ = β βge
1 − t x
ge r α α =
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4.4  Generalized  Impulse  Responses 
 
A standard way of judging the interaction of variables in a cointegrated system is to 
conduct impulse response analysis,
8 as has been advocated by Lütkepohl and Reimers 
(1992). Usually, in such an analysis the cointegrated VAR is subject to an 
orthogonalized shock in one variable and the response of the system is examined. Of 
course, this approach suffers, due to the dependence of the results on identifying 
assumptions employed to obtain the orthogonalized shocks. 
Recent results of Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998) though, have re-
examined the concept of impulse response analysis, aiming to remove this shortcoming. 
Instead of using orthogonalized impulse responses, one may use generalized impulse 
responses (GIR) that are based on a ‘typical’ shock to the system. The average response 
of the system to this typical shock is compared to the average baseline model where the 
shock is absent. Rather than examining the effect of a pure orthogonalized shock to, say, 
revenues, GIR analysis considers a typical historical innovation, which embodies 
information on the contemporaneous correlations between the innovations. 
 
8 See also Sims (1980) for an original contribution on the use of impulse response analysis. PANAGIOTIS T. KONSTANTINOU  90
The argument about GIR may be explained as follows. Let the Vector Moving 
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9  It similarly follows that 
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As shown in Pesaran and Shin (1998), the GIR will be numerically equivalent to the 
standard impulse response function based on Cholesky decompositions if Ω  is 
diagonal.  
 
9 In general, Pesaran and Shin (1998) show that one can interpret generalized impulse responses for a 
stationary vector process   as  t y ( ) ( ) ( ). , , 1 1 1 − + − + − ℑ − ℑ = = ℑ
+ t h t t t h t t y y E u y E GIR
h t δ δ  They also explain 
that in a linear system, the impulse responses will be invariant to history (the information set on which 
conditioning is made), and so the GIR will depend only on the composition of the shocks as defined by  δ . BALANCING THE BUDGET    91
5.  EMPIRICAL  RESULTS 
 
5.1    Unit Root and Stationarity Tests 
 
In order to see if there exists any long-run relationship between the variables of 
interest, I first tested for the order of integration of each variable. Since its is by now 
well known that the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests have very low power, I also 
relied on ADF-type tests proposed by Elliott et al. (1996), denoted DF-GLS, which are 
based on prior detrending of the data using GLS and then estimating the ADF-type 
regression. I also used stationarity tests proposed by Kwiatkowski et al. (1992), denoted 
KPSS, where stationarity is taken as the null hypothesis, against the alternative of a unit 
root. These three tests make a good combination, as the null in the first two is the 
alternative of the latter. The results are reported in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1.    Unit Root and Stationarity Tests 
Panel A: Unit Root and Stationarity Tests for the Levels 
  t r   t ge   t s   CV 5% 
ADF  -0.356 (3)  0.170 (12)  -0.583 (12)  -2.889 
DF-GLS  0.803 (3)  0.376 (10)  0.171 (12)  -1.943 
KPSS  1.130 (9)  1.258 (8)  1.158 (8)  0.463 
Panel B: Unit Root and Stationarity Tests for the First Differences 
  t r ∆   t ge ∆   t s ∆   CV 5% 
ADF  -17.132 (0)  -16.358 (0)  -16.075 (0)  -2.889 
DF-GLS  -2.219 (10)  -15.672 (0)  -2.781 (5)  -1.943 
KPSS  0.053 (8)  0.211 (28)  0.216 (33)  0.463 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are the lags used in the ADF-type tests chosen by the modified AIC (Ng 
and Perron (2001)) or the bandwidth parameter for the KPSS tests. 
 
 
All three tests indicated that the revenue and expenditure series are consistent with 
the hypothesis of a unit root. Additionally, I have examined the stationarity properties of 
the budget surplus,  , which was also found to be consistent with a unit root. 
This constitutes prima facie evidence that the Greek government has not followed a 
policy that is consistent with long-run solvency, and that would render the budget 
surplus stationary. This has the further implication that shocks will have a permanent 
effect on the budget surplus. This issue is further explored below. 
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5.2  Testing  the  Intertemporal Restriction 
 
In order to test whether the series constitute a cointegrated system and evaluate the 
intertemporal restriction more rigorously in a multivariate framework, the Johansen 
procedure was employed. The VEqCM model was estimated by using four lags, 
including an unrestricted drift term. The choice of the lag-length was based on the 
Akaike information criterion (Akaike (1969)) and on tests for no autocorrelation present 
in the residuals.
10  The results are summarized in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2.  Cointegration  Tests  System  () ′ = t t t ge r x  
Panel A: Trace and Maximum Eigenvalue Tests 
Trace Test:    ) / ( n r Q Maximum Eigenvalue Test:    ) 1 / ( + r r Q
0 H   1 H   ) / ( n r Q   p-value  1 H   1 H   ) 1 / ( + r r Q   p-value 
0 = r   1 ≥ r   17.44 [0.023]  0 = r   1 ≥ r   17.43 [0.013] 
1 ≤ r   2 = r   0.01 [0.906]  1 ≤ r   2 = r   0.01 [0.906] 
Panel B: Multivariate Autocorrelation Diagnostics 
Test Statistic  p-value 
Autocorrelation LM(1)  0.023 
Autocorrelation LM(4)  0.140 
Panel C: Cointegrating Relation 
()   779 . 12              ) . (




ge - r x t t t β
 
Notes: The estimation was based on a VEqCM of order four (VAR(5)), with the number of lags chosen by 
the Akaike information criterion (AIC). The model included a constant term unrestricted. The 
Autocorrelation    is a test for i-th order autocorrelation distributed as a  4 , 1 ) ( LM = i i ( ) 4
2 χ . The asymptotic 
p-values for the cointegration test are calculated using the method of Doornik (1998). 
 
 
Both the maximum eigenvalue and the trace statistic suggest that there is exactly one 
cointegrating vector. More specifically, the null of no cointegration is rejected at the 5% 
significance level (the associated p-values for the trace and maximum eigenvalue 
statistics are 0.023 and 0.013 respectively), whereas the null that the rank is one is not 
rejected by both tests. This provides evidence that government revenues and 
expenditures are tied together in the long run, sharing a common stochastic trend. More 
specifically, there is evidence of a unique statistical equilibrium, that works as an 
 
10  The assumption of no autocorrelation is the most crucial one for the Johansen (1995) Maximum 
Likelihood procedure. Other deviations from whiteness do not seem to severely influence cointegration 
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‘attractor’ for the variables.
11  The estimated long-run relationship is given in panel C of 
Table 2 (with t-statistic in parenthesis). 
The estimated cointegration vector normalized on the revenues variable is 
  This long-run relationship allows one to evaluate whether the intertemporal 
restriction holds or not. A likelihood ratio (LR) test of the restriction that the 
cointegration vector is [  yields a statistic of 14.39, which is distributed as a 
 variate. Thus, the restriction implied by Equation (5), is violated. I will return to 
this issue below, where evidence on the neutrality hypothesis is presented and this 
hypothesis is examined in more detail. 
]. 471 . 0 , 1 [ −
() 1
2 χ
] 1 , 1 −
Another important issue, along with the existence of cointegration between the 
variables in the system, is the issue of stability of the long-run relationships through time, 
as well as the stability of the estimated coefficients of such relationships.
12 Hansen and 
Johansen (1999) have suggested methods for the evaluation of parameter constancy in 
cointegrated VAR models, utilizing estimates obtained from the FIML estimation 
procedure. The first test deals with the hypothesis of constancy of the cointegration 
space for a given cointegration rank. Hansen and Johansen (1999) have proposed a 
likelihood ratio test that is constructed by comparing the likelihood from each recursive 
sub-sample to the likelihood function calculated under the restriction that the 
cointegrating vectors estimated from the full sample fall within the space spanned by the 
estimated vectors of each individual sample. The test statistic is   distributed with 
 degrees of freedom (see also Hansen and Juselius (1995)). The second test 
examines the constancy of each individual element of the identified cointegrating 
vectors, 
2 χ
() r r n−
β . Additionally, one can also exploit the fact that there is a unique relationship 
between the eigenvalues and the cointegrating vectors.
13   Therefore, when the 
cointegrating vectors have undergone a structural shift this will be reflected in the 
estimated eigenvalues. Hansen and Johansen (1999) have derived the asymptotic 
distribution as well as the asymptotic variance of the estimated eigenvalues. Finally, 
Hansen and Johansen (1999) have also proposed two versions of a LM test, the Nyblom 
  and   tests, to examine the constancy of the cointegrating space. 
These last two tests have non-standard distributions and have to be simulated. 
() t
T Q sup () t
T meanQ
The graphical output of these tests is reported in Figures 1 and 2. In both figures, the 
reported results are based on recursive estimation of the model starting on the first 
quarter of 1979, due to the small sample available. First, Panels A and C of figure 1 
show evidence that the recursive estimate of   is stable, since both the recursive  ge β
 
11 See also Johansen (1995) for a geometric interpretation of cointegration and the ‘attractor’ set. 
12 I am thankful to an anonymous referee of this journal for raising this issue on an earlier draft of the 
paper. 





− −   (see Johansen (1995), Chapter 6 
for a detailed analysis with all the derivations of the formula). PANAGIOTIS T. KONSTANTINOU  94
coefficient estimate and the time path of the recursively estimated eigenvalue, are 
virtually flat. Second, Panel B of figure 1 shows an asymptotically   distributed test, 
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β1997:Q1  ∈ span(βτ) − R Representation 
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βge × +/− 2 SE 
Note: Panel A reports the recursively-estimated non-zero eigenvalue, Panel B the test for stability of 
β ( -distributed) and Panel C the recursive estimates of  .  () 2
2 χ ge β
 
Figure 1.    Cointegrating Space Parameter Stability Tests 
 
 
Again, the test statistic provides evidence in favor of the cointegrating space constancy 
null. Finally, Figure 2 displays the Nyblom tests proposed in Hansen and Johansen 
(1999), where it is also evident that there is no significant parameter instability 
associated with the cointegrating space.
14, 15 
 
14 The 5% asymptotic critical value for the  ( ) t
T Q sup  test is 1.776 and the corresponding bootstrapped 
critical value is 2.509. These critical values have been obtained by Monte Carlo simulation (10.000 
replications). In addition, I have also found that  ( ) 02 . 1 =
t
T Q sup  and  ( ) 09 . 0 =
t
T meanQ with associated 
asymptotic p-values of [0.24] and [0.60] (and bootstrapped p-values of [0.21] and [0.58]) respectively. 
15 In addition to these parameter stability tests, I have experimented using dummies in the VEqCM model. 
More specifically, I have utilized two dummies for to account for the two political parties in power from 1974 
onwards (New Democracy and PASOK). LR and Wald tests of the exclusion restrictions (  distributed)  () 4




Notes: The figure plots the Nyblom test Q  for the stability of (unrestricted) 
) (t
T β  along with the 
asymptotic (1.776) and bootstrapped (2.509) critical values (for the ). The critical values were 





Figure 2.  Nyblom Tests of Stability of the Cointegrating Space 
 
 
5.3  Causality 
 
Assessment of the direction of the causal nexus is an empirical issue. By causality, I 
mean causality in Granger’s (1969) sense. That is I would like to examine whether one 
variable precedes the other, or if they are contemporaneous. In this case the question as 
to whether  causes   amounts to testing how much of the current value of the 
second variable can be explained by past values of the first variable. So   is said to 
be Granger-caused by  , if the coefficients of lagged   are statistically significant in 
the regression of    on lagged values of all the variables in the information set. A test 
of Granger-causality can be empirically carried out by means of the VAR model (in 






were 2.017 and 4.715 (p-values [0.733] and [0.318]) respectively, indicating no significant parameter change 
due to different political parties in power. I have also experimented using a dummy for the Maastricht treaty, 
and again both the LR and the Wald tests (  distributed) were 0.028 and 0.038 (p-values [0.986] and 
[0.981]) respectively, thereby also reflecting no significant parameter change. 
( ) 2
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levels) if the variables are stationary. However, if this is not the case, the test statistics 
will converge to non-standard distributions, and the empirical results can be misleading 
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where   are error terms, which are assumed to be white noise. According to 
Granger (1988), the presence of cointegration implies Granger-causality in at least one 
direction between the variables involved. A further distinction is that of long-run vs. 









r i , ,   Γ Γ  are jointly zero for all i, then the 
hypothesis that   does not Granger-cause   in the short run cannot be 
rejected, while if the value of 
) t ge ( t r ) ( t t r ge
( )
) r
r ge α α  
(   and   α ge
 is zero the hypothesis that   does not 
Granger-cause   in the long run cannot be rejected. Similarly, the joint 
hypotheses that   are zero, implies Granger non-causality from 
 to  . 
) ( t t ge r






) ( t t r ge
,    α
r
i ge Γ
) ( t t ge r
Before examining the direction of Granger causality, I have estimated the 
unrestricted VEqCM (with the cointegrating vector unrestricted). The results along with 
some diagnostic tests are reported in Table 3. 
The results show that both equations are well specified in terms of autocorrelation - 
although normality is ascent - with quite some predictive ability for each equation 
(relative to a random walk with drift benchmark). It is important also to point out that 
both variables seem to equilibrium correct significantly towards the underlying long-run 
relationship, while both adjustment coefficients have the expected sign. 
The results from the Granger causality test are summarized in Table 4. 
From Table 4, it is evident that there is long-run causality running in both directions, 
with the long-run non-causality from   to    being only marginally rejected. On the 
other hand, expenditure does not Granger-cause revenue in the short-run, while the joint 
hypothesis of Granger non-causality from   to r  finds strong empirical support. 
Based on these findings, and recalling our discussion in Section 2, I can conclude that 
the Greek fiscal authorities have been behaving according to the tax and spend 
hypothesis, since revenues precede spending. This also implies that the Greek fiscal 
authorities should probably follow a fiscal adjustment, by reducing spending rather than 
increasing revenues. This is further explored below. 
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Table 3.  VEqCM  Estimates 
Equation 
Dependent Variable 



































































































2 R   0.372 0.645 
Adjusted   
2 R 0.312 0.611 
Autocorrelation LM(4)  4.953 [0.292]  13.427 [0.010] 
ARCH LM (4)  2.741 [0.602]  4.964 [0.291] 
NORM   () 2
2 χ 12.432 [0.002]  25.394 [0.000] 
Notes:   stands for the first difference operator. The Autocorrelation LM(4) and ARCH LM(4) are 
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Table 4.  Granger  Causality  Tests 
0 H   ge r α α /   ge
r i
r




ge i r , , / Γ Γ U U α α  
t t r ge f ≠   () 58 . 3 1
2 = χ  [0.06] ( ) 09 7 4
2 . = χ  [0.13] ( ) 35 7 5
2 . = χ   [0.19] 
t t ge r f ≠   () 16 . 10 1
2 = χ [0.00] ( ) 11 12 4
2 . = χ  [0.02] ( ) 04 15 5
2 . = χ   [0.01] 
t t t t ge r r ge f I f ≠ ≠   () 15 17 2
2 . = χ [0.00] ( ) 09 21 8
2 . = χ  [0.01] ( ) 89 . 25 10
2 = χ  [0.00] 
Notes: The symbol   denotes Granger non-causality. The first hypothesis is that spending does not 
Granger-cause revenues, the second that revenue does not Granger-cause spending, and the last that spending 




5.4    Assessing the Neutrality of Adjustments 
 
In this subsection, I examine whether fiscal adjustments by revenue 
increase or spending decrease are neutral for balancing the budget. In addition 
to testing the two hypotheses outlined in Section 4, Garcia and Henin (1999) 
also suggest that one can evaluate the overall probability of neutrality as:
16 
( ) ( ) ( ). 1 Pr Pr 1 Pr ge r ge ge r ge α α β α α β = = − = + = I  The results of these tests are presented 
in Table 5. 
 
 
Table 5.    Tests on the Cointegrating Vector and the Adjustment Coefficients 









1 - 1 : 0  
Coint. Vector  β  
(t-statistics) 
()
() 779 . 12 - ,
0.471 - 1
L () ′ 1 - 1  
( )
() 826 . 5 - ,
479 . 0 - 1
K () ′ 1 - 1  
Adjustment Coeff. 





















LR    () () v v Q
2 ~ χ   Q(1) = 14.39  Q(1) = 14.08 Q(2) = 16.73 
p-value   [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.00] 
 
 
16 Formally speaking, the joint restrictions on  β  and  is problematic, since for the VAR model 
with just one lag it implies that 
ge r α α ,
[ ] [ ] r   , = Γ −α n I   ,   , 1   , 1 = ′ ⊥ α α β r = ′ ⊥ , hence  0 = ′ = Γ ′ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ β α β α  and 
process   becomes  I(2) (see Johansen (1995, Ch.9)).  t xBALANCING THE BUDGET    99
The first column of Table 5 contains the unrestricted estimates of the parameters of 
interest. The second column presents the parameters of interest under the restriction that 
the budget surplus is stationary, which delivers a LR test of 14.39, hence rejecting the 
null. Similarly, the third column presents the parameter estimates under the restriction of 
equality of the speed of adjustment of revenue and expenditure. The results indicate that 
this hypothesis is also strongly rejected, delivering a LR test of 14.08. Finally, the last 
column of presents a test of the joint hypothesis of balanced budget and equal 
adjustment, which is also strongly rejected. Overall my results indicate that the 
neutrality hypothesis does not hold for Greece.
17  
The results just presented, are based on the full sample period. One could of course 
imagine that some of these hypotheses hold in some sub-periods while they fail for 
others.
18  In order to entertain this possibility, I have recursively calculated all the above 
LR tests for a period starting from the first quarter of 1979. The graphical output is 
reported in Figure 3. Before proceeding with the discussion of the findings, a word of 
caution is necessary regarding the interpretation of the findings. These tests are 
asymptotically distributed as   variates. This holds for relatively large samples and 
under the assumption of Gaussian residuals, which, as we saw from Table 3, seems to be 
violated. Hence the results that follow should be interpreted as suggestive rather than 
definite, given the absence of residual normality.   
2 χ
Having put the analysis in perspective, notice that the restriction of budget balance 
seems to hold for the period prior to 1981, i.e., before the socialist government of 
PASOK came to power (Panel A, Figure 3). Similarly, the restriction of equal speeds of 
adjustment seems to hold for the period prior to 1986, and for some quarters in the early 
1990s (Panel B, Figure 3). In addition, the estimate of the cointegrating parameter   
(Panel C, Figure 3) - under the restriction of equal speeds of adjustment - seems to be 
stable, albeit the associated confidence bands seem to be wider for the whole 1990s. 
Finally, as far as the joint restriction of balanced budget and equal speed of adjustment is 
concerned, it can clearly be seen from Panel D of Figure 3, that this joint restriction 
seems to hold prior to 1981, while - with a few exceptions - it is violated throughout the 





17 In an earlier draft of this paper, I also employed the multivariate Beveridge-Nelson decomposition from 
a VEqCM where the balanced budget restrictions was imposed, in an effort to identify whether the deviations 
of expenditures and revenues from a balanced budget was due to ‘trend’ or due to ‘cyclical’ movements. The 
‘cyclical’ components from that exercise were not stationary. I obtained similar results employing the 
Gonzalo and Granger (1995) decomposition and its modification by Proietti (1997). Therefore the distinction 
between ‘trend’ and ‘cyclical’ movements in spending and revenue was inadequate in identifying whether 
spending or revenues were more responsible for the fiscal deficit. I am grateful to an anonymous referee of 
this journal pointing this out to me.   
18 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for bringing this to my attention.   PANAGIOTIS T. KONSTANTINOU  100
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Q(1) − H0: αr = αge  χ 2(1) 





βge with αr = αge × +/− 2 SE 





Q(2) − H0: βr = βge & αr = αge  χ 2(2) 
 
Notes: Panel A reports the recursively-estimated LR test for intertemporal solvency, Panel B the recursively 
calculated LR test of equal adjustment coefficients, Panel C the recursive estimates of   under the 
assumption that  , and Panel D the LR test of intertemporal solvency and equal adjustment 
coefficients. 
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Figure 3.    Recursively Calculated Neutrality Tests 
 
 
Unfortunately, the neutrality test is only a limited tool for assessing the efficiency of 
alternative strategies of balancing a budget through cuts in expenditures or through tax 
increases, because it is informative only for the long-run, whereas the adjustment path 
during the transition period may matter considerably in relation to political issues, owing 
to the relatively short-term political perspective in representative democracies. For this 
reason, I have also employed impulse response functions associated with the VEqCM 
summarized in Table 3. Instead trying to identify “structural” shocks, here I proceed 
using GIRs.
19 Such an exercise provides valuable insights about the long-run change of 
 
19 In an earlier draft of the paper I have assumed that a discretionary cut in expenditure is defined as that 
part of innovation in expenditures, which is orthogonal to revenue innovation and similarly, a discretionary 
revenue increase aiming at deficit reduction has to be orthogonal to spending innovations. Here I would like 
to thank an anonymous referee of this journal for pointing out that, it is hard to argue that discretionary 
revenue (expenditure) innovations can be derived form a VEqCM with the whole revenue (expenditure) 
innovations. 
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both the expenditure and revenue ratio, i.e., of the ‘size of government’. The graphical 








Horizon for Impulse Responses in Years After the Shock
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Notes: The confidence intervals calculated by Monte Carlo Simulation. Panels (A), (C), (E) display the 
effects of a (generalized) government expenditure shock normalized to correspond to a - 1% decrease to   
(Panel A), to   (panel C) and to  . Panels (B), (D) and (F) display the effects of an increase 
in revenue normalized to correspond to 1%.   
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Figure 4.  Generalized  Impulse  Responses 
 
 
Panels A, C and E of Figure 4 report the impulse responses to unit expenditure cut 
shock, whereas panels B, D, and F the impulse responses to a unit increase in 
government revenues. First notice that the generalized nature of these impulse responses 
is apparent from the simultaneous behavior of the both variables in the system. Typically, 
a positive shock to revenue is associated with a positive shock to spending, and vice 
versa. Additionally, what is remarkable in these plots is that the previous analysis is 
confirmed and strengthened. Observe that that a 1% cut in expenditure leads to 
permanently lower expenditure and revenue levels, but it also leads to an improvement 
of the budget surplus, with the long-run effect being 0.053%. On the other hand a 1% 
increase in revenue, leads to permanently higher level of revenue, but government 
expenditure is increased by much more, leading to a worsening of the budget surplus of 
the order of magnitude of 0.333%. Remarkably, the impulse responses also indicate that 
the Greek fiscal authorities behave according to the tax and spend hypothesis, since as PANAGIOTIS T. KONSTANTINOU  102
discussed above, in this case an increase in government revenues would result in even 
higher government deficit. Another important feature that comes forth is that reduction 
of the government deficit can be more efficiently performed via reductions in spending 
rather than increasing taxation. 
 
 
6.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
 
This study has used some recent advances in the testing of long-run equilibrium 
relationships to shed light on the long-run relation between the two Greek government’s 
budget components. More specifically, the aim was to describe the historical behavior of 
the Greek government and to suggest ways of eliminating the budget deficit by 
analyzing the relative efficiency of revenue increase vs. spending reduction. Several 
recent developments in the econometric analysis of non-stationary processes and 
cointegration were applied and a number of novel results stem from the analysis. 
First, using Johansen’s (1995) FIML testing strategy, it was established that 
government spending and revenues share a common stochastic trend, but the restriction 
for intertemporal solvency is violated for the whole sample examined. I then examined 
the parameter stability of the cointegrating relation estimated by means of tests proposed 
by Hansen and Johansen (1999) and my results indicated that the cointegrating space is 
stable over the recursive sub-sample period and that the estimated coefficients do not 
exhibit instabilities in recursive parameter estimates.   
Second, utilizing causality tests, I found that revenue precedes government 
expenditures and that the behavior of the Greek fiscal authorities is consistent with the 
tax and spend hypothesis. I have further evaluated the relative efficiency of fiscal 
adjustments via revenue or spending, showing that the two alternative fiscal stabilization 
measures are not neutral. More specifically, recursive tests showed that the neutrality 
hypothesis might have been valid for some periods in the sample, especially before the 
1990s, but post 1990 it is clearly violated.   
Finally, in an effort to examine the dynamic interaction of the Greek fiscal variables, 
I have utilized generalized impulse response analysis. This also indicated that raising 
revenue would lead to higher spending, thus worsening the budget balance, whereas 
decreasing spending would lead to an improvement of the deficit. Therefore, the policy 
implications of the analysis seem quite clear. In order for the government to restore its 
intertemporal budget balance, government expenditures must begin to grow at a lower 
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